Policies are often used to define management strategies for networks, storage services or applications. Validation determines whether the policy implementation is feasible for the specific environment to which they apply and requires checking that the policy is consistent with the functional or resource constraints within the target environment. For example, do the policies assume functionality or specific operations, which do not exist in target routers, or bandwidth in excess of the capacity of data links? Where possible, static checking should be done prior to policy deployment in order to detect invalid policies at design time, but there are some policies, related to resource allocation, that depend on the current state of the system, and require policy constraints that must be checked dynamically at execution time. In this paper, we show how PONDER policies can be implemented and validated for Differentiated Services (DiffServ) by using CIM as the modelling framework for network resources as this is device independent. We describe a CIM DiffServ-metrics sub-model extcnsion of the CIM Network sub-model which represents DiffServ traffic statistics and a Linux driver which translates CIM classes and variables to Linux traffic control classes and variables respectively.
Motivation
Thcre is considerable intercst in the Internet community on policy-based techniques as a means of implementing adaptive QoS (Quality of Service) management, caching, persistence and security to support modern multimedia applications, mobility and ubiquitous computing. Policies are defmed as rules governing the choices in behaviour of a system. Authorisation policies define what services or resources a subject (management agent, user or role) can access. Obligation policies are event triggered condition-action rules which can be used to modify the behaviour of routers, firewalls, or even applications in response to events such as failures, system attacks or respect to generic CIM target objects and so can be used for many different network clrments which then map the CIM variables and actions to thosc actually implemented by the specific device. CIM could also be used to model the elements which actually interpret policies and perform policy-based management, but there is less emphasis on standardisation of these as they are vendor specific. Eventually vcndors may support CIM interfaces to devices and network elements. In this paper we give a mapping from CIM to Linux Traffic Control commands for.Difi3ei-v routers.
In section 2 of the paper we outline the PONDER Policy framework and section 3
claborates on policy validation within the framework. Section 4 describes our implemcntation of policy enforcement and validation for Linux DiffServ routers, section 5 gives example usage of our implementation with conclusions in section 6 .
The PONDER Policy Framework
PONDER is an object-oriented, declarative language developed at Imperial College for specifying management and security policies . [I] . For example, the following authorisation policy with the name bwalloc permits the Agroup to perform the action of setting up a videoconference with bandwidth of 4 Mbis and priority of 3 to the BGroup in New York or the Dgroup in Boston between 16.00 and 18.00 daily. The following obligation policy type named videoSetUp, takes two parametersa subjcct which cvaluates the policy and a target on which the action to reserve bandwidth is performed, when an event is received for a VideoRequest with the requested bandwidth bw as a parameter. A constraint defmes that the reservation will only take place if the allocated bandwidth plus the request is less than a maximum allowed bandwidth. It is assumed that the allocated and maximum bandwidth are variables hcld within the subject. Two instances of the policy are then created for different gateway subjects and router targets. Management struchucs can be defined as configurations of roles with policies applying to rclationships between roles for organisational units such as departments or buildings. Inheritance permits specialisation of existing policy specifications for different environmcnts. PONDER also allows complex actions to he implemented by dynamically loading scripts within the subject policy interpreter. Further details of the PONDER language are described in [I] . It should he noted that PONDER provides a superset of the functionality of the IETF and DMTF Policy Corc Information Model (PCIM) and supports event triggered condition action rules, which is an essential requirement for adaptive policy-based management which performs management actions in response to external evcnts.
3.
We can observe that the enforcement of a network-level policy results in the creation and/or configuration of the functional elements which implement the policy within thc routers to which the policy applies. For example, in a DiffServ environment, network policies are implemented through the creation, configuration and parameterisation of classifiers. meters, schedulers, queues, etc., that the network elements support. These individual functional elements are described in several information models, such as the CIM Network sub-model [3] , and IETF DifServ
In this context, a policy is validated with respect to the target device capabilities to determine w,hether the target device is able to create the requested new functional element andlor configure functional elements with requested values. In the following, we will provide details of each case of validation and we will outline how policy validation can be implemented within the PONDER framework using CIM as the model for representing the policy target mechanisms and capabilities. In the general case this type of policy validation can be implemented within the PONDER framework by using meta-policies as a means to specify the constraints that network policies must satisfy with respect to the DiffServ mechanisms that the targets support. Meta-policies defined in PONDER specify constraints over a set of policies, with respect to the permitted types of policies or the elements within the policies.
Policy
These constraints apply to policies within a specific scope and effectively limit the permitted policies in the system. This allows the policies to be checked at specification time, before deployment, which is clearly an advantage over checking at policy execution time. The syntax of a meta-policy is based on the OMG Object Constraint Language (OCL) [5]. The body of the meta-policy specifies the constraint as a series of OCL semicolons separated expressions which can be boolean or navigation expressions. If any of the boolean expressions evaluates to frue, execution stops and the action following the raises-clause is executed. Example 2 shows a metapolicy specifying constraints over a set of network policies with respect to the DiffServ mechanisms supported by policy targets. but meta-policies can be used for specifying validation constraints for any underlying technology. invalid-policies -> notErnpty: }
The body of the meta-policy contains two OCL expressions. The first one selects all policies (p) with the following characteristics: the action set of p contains at least one action named "addDiffServElement", whose parameter type (i.e. the type of the D i m e N element that p wants to add to each of the target devices) is not supported by at least one of the policy's target devices. Note that we use the OCL method oclType to obtain the type of the "addDiffServE~ement" action parameter. The action notsupports on the target device is a look-up operation on the CIM representation of the device which returns true if the device does not support the specific DiffServ element type. passed as a parameter. The second OCL expression returns true if the variable invalid-policies, which is returned from the first OCL exception is not empty. If the result of the last expression is true, the nolSupportedElernentException specified in the raises-clause is executed with the invalid-policies set as a parameter. An obligation policy could be triggered by this exception to perform corrective actions to resolve invalid policies. An example would be to install missing DiffServ mechanisms in a programmable router, as shown in example 3. The exception nolSupportedElernentException from Example 2 triggers the obligation policy PolicyForlnvalidDiffServPolicies which installs the missing Diferv mechanisms in the relevant programmable router. implemented as a script policy action which finds the pairs < target-device, nonsupponcd mechanism > and installs the non-supported.mechanisms in the appropriate target dcvices using the method installMechanism.
As mcntioned earlier. a policy is not valid when the device does not have the resources to create the requested functional element. As an example. consider a DiftServ dcvice that can only support a limited number of traffic classes. A policy that tries to create a new traffic class within the device will fail if the maximum limit is exceeded.
This case of policy validation can be implemented using our CIM extensions as a means to specify the necessary information about the capabilities and the current state of thc device -the maximum number of traffic classes and the current number of classes respectively. Since the current version of CIM does not include DiffServspecific capabilities and state information, wc are proposing a "DifiServ-metrics" extension to provide this information, which we will present in detail in section 4.
Hou'evcr. unlike the previous case, we cannot decide offline whether the policy is valid by checking the CIM representation of the device, since the decision depends on device current state. This means that the decision must be made at the time the policy is to be enforced, which implies that the conditions under which the policy is valid must be 'specified as constraints within rhe polic?; specficarion, as indicated in the follou,ing example. The policy rule PolicyToAddTrafficClass will only add a new traffic class when current number of classes is less than the maximum. Assume that CIM extensions can provide the, necessary information about the capabilities and the current state of the device: the total output bandwidth.and current allocated bandwidth to all traffic classes respectively. However, we cannot decidc offline whether the policy is valid so the validity must be specified as constraints in the policy specification. which is similar to the policy in example 4 so is not shown here.
Summary
A CIM based model for representing network devices, can provide two types of management information: a Information about device's capabilities (e.g. type of mechanisms it supports, bounds on resources. bounds on specific objects' attributes) e Information about the current state of the device (e.g. current resource allocation, current values of specific objects' attributes) We can use this information to support static policy validation with respect to device capahilitics, which can be performed omme using meta-policies as a means to specify the constraints on the permitted DiffServ mechanisms, resources and bounds on ohjectattrihutes. The required information about the capabilities of the devices can he obtained from CIM models. Dynamic policy validation with respect to current state of the device can only be performed at the time the policy is to be enforced, by means of constraints which are specified as part of the policy rules to define the conditions under which the policy is valid. These constraints can reference information extracted from the CIM device model.
Implementation of policy enforcement and policy validation on
Linux DiffServ routers Our implementation uses the ClM network sub-model for representing the DiffServ elements that a router supports. In addition, since we need statistics related to DiffServ. e.g. number of implemented traffic classes, bandwidth allocated to each class of traffic, we have designed a "DiffSew metrics" sub-model extension to CIM. which provides this information for the management system as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure I: UML Diagram of the DiffServ-metrics CIM sub-model extension
The CIM class DiffSeivRouter is the abstraction of a DiffServ-enabled router and derivcs from the System class in the Core Model and focuses on representing a system that is DiffSew-enabled. The classes DSCPStatistics, NetworklnterfaceStatistics and GroupDSCPStatistics derive from the CIM class StatisticalData in the Core Model (this inheritance is not shown in Figure I ). The NetworklnterfaceStatistics class provides traffic statistics for every network interface card that belongs to the router. The DSCPStatistics class caters for statistics per implcmented DSCP. A DSCPStatistics instance is associated with one or more NetworklnterfaceStatistics instances, as a particular DSCP may be implemented in more that one network interface on a single router. Finally, the GroupDSCPStatistics class is an aggregation of DSCPStatistics classes and provides statistics for a group of DSCPs which together define a class of service offered to the corresponding traffic aggregates. For example, the "Gold Group" in a router may be ConStNcted from the DSCP offering the Expedited Forwarding per hop behaviour (EF PHB) [SI, while the "Silver Group" may be constructed from the DSCPs offering the Assured Forwarding per hop behaviour (AF PHB) [7] . A DSCPStatistics instance may belong to more than one GroupDSCPStatistics instances.
The DifTServ part of the CIM network sub-model and the DifTServ metrics submodel have been implemented within the CIM Object Manager (CIMOM) from the WBEM Services project [a] . It provides a Java implementation of a CIMOM with two interfaces as shown in Figure 2 . These are:
The javax.wbem.client interface, used by clients for transferring CIM classes to and from the CIMOM. This communication can be realised either through HTTP (where CIM operations are defined in XML) or through Java RMI.
The javax.wbem.provider interface, which providers attached to the CIMOM use to communicate with the CIMOM. Providers are implemented as Java classes and each provider is responsible for handling one or more CIM classes. Our current implementation includes a CIM2TC Linux Driver which is used to configure a Linux router using traffic control commands [9] via CIM classes specified in the CIM network sub-model. This approach is similar to that of [IO] , in which a driver component is used to translate classes that follow the DiffServ MIB object model [ I I] to Linux traffic control commands. We have used the '.jtc" package from this implementation to represent the traffic control mechanisms of the Linux DifTServ router which is indicated as the LinuxDifTServ.LinuxDriver.tc package in our implementation, as shown in Figure 3 . However our implementation overcomes the CIM. Note that in our current implementation, in addition to the CIM classes defined in the CIM network sub-model, we have also used the non-CIM class Filter to represent a generic DiffServ filter within a ClassifierElement, its subclasses IngressFilter and EgressFilter to distinguish among filters at the egress and ingress interfaces and the association ClassifierElementUsesFilters to associate Filter objects to ClassifierElements. The ClM2TCDriver parses each TCB chain using the translation algorithm outlined above in order to derive the set of "tc" classes that correspond to the input TCB. We have also developed a Graphical User Interface for manually configuring Linux routers [12] . Figure 1 (shown as provider B in Figure 2 ). This communicates with the ClMMonitor component to get DiffSeN variables from the Linux operating system by issuing traffic control statistics commands ("tc -s commands"). For example, in order to obtain the CIM variable CurrentClassesOffrafic (from CIM class DiffServRouter), Provider B issues a request to the CIMMonitor, which in turn queries the current "tc" configuration of the device to get the current number of implemcnted DiffSeN classes. An alternative for retrieving DiffServ traffic statistics could be to use SNMP to get variables from a DiffSeN RMON probe indicated by Provider C in figure 2 which could translate CIM attributes to SNMP get requests for an RMOM MIB. However, there is not yet a n implementation of an RMON probe for DiffServ on Linux, so this has not been implemented.
We have implemented Provider A shown in Figure 2 to handle the DiffServ CIM classes that belong to the package Linux.DiffSeN.LinuxDriver presented in Figure 3 .
This provider is used to change the configuration of the Linnx router starting from the CIM representation of the DiffSeN mechanisms. This is done by communicating the new TCBs to the CIMZTCDriver component. It would be possible to use SNMP to configure the Linux device, as described in [I31 and indicated by Provider D in Figure 2 . which could issue SNMP set requests to set MIB variables withh the DifiSen, MIB. We were unable to find a complete implementation of a DiftServ MIB for Linux, so have not implemented this.
We have provided PONDER Policy Management Agents (PMAs) and Target Policy Objects [I41 as CIM clients to allow the PONDER components, which reside in the Nrhvork Management System in Figure 2 . to addlupdatelremove CIM classes to configure the Linux DiffServ mechanism and evaluate policy constraints or metapolicies that contain CIM variables. Note that the PONDER system docs not communicate directly with the ClMZTCDriver or the CIMMonitor components. but via the CIMOM. This allows the PONDER system to configure and validate policies that apply to other types of CIM-enabled devices as well as Linux routers.
Linux Router Configuration Example
In the following, we will show an example of using our prototype implementation based on a testbed of 4 Linux DiftSeN routers to enforce the policy validation rule presented in Example 4. The core router in ow network Setup is the Linux box ~c l r ; / / e s (146,169.14.74). The policy rule PolicyToAddTraffcClass must he applied to the target devices only if the current number of implemented DiffServ classes is less than the maximum number the devices can support. The administrator uses the Editor tool of the PONDER Toolkit [I41 to edit, compile, load and enable the policy rule PolicyToAddTrafficClass. The policy objects are scored in an LDAP directory s e~e r . The policy rule PolicyToAddTrafficClass is evaluated at run-time by the management agent Netwo&PMA. If the constraint defined by the when clause evaluates to true, the target router is instructed to perform the addTrafficClass operation. The NetworkPMA receives the obligation event addTrafficClassRequest with parameters indicating the network interface on the target where the new class is to be added, the DSCP associated with the traffic class, the bandwidth and the priority that will be assigned to this class. The policy rule retrieves the relevant CIM variables from the target router and evaluates the policy constraint which evaluates to true for the request addTrafficClassRequest ("ethl", 43, 450, 6) .
(OxZb) is the new DSCP we want to implement. As the policy rule is valid for the current network state, it will be enforced on the network. However the second time this rule is triggered, the policy constraint evaluates to false since we have reached the maximum number of supported classes and therefore the policy action is not enforced. Figure 5 displays the "tc" commands that the CIMZTCDriver generated for performing the policy action addTrafficClass, when the action is implemented as the TCB presented in Figure 4 . It also displays the new DiffServ configuration upon the enforcement of the policy action addTrafficClass.
Further implementation work is needed to integrate the PONDER Editor with the Graphical User Interface so that the administrator is able to graphically specify policy actions that involve CIM classes to addiupdateidelete TCBs within the managed devices. Finally, we also aim to integrate our policy framework with the CISCO Information Model (CIM-CX) that represents Cisco's specific network mechanisms. This will enable our framework to apply to both Linux and Cisco routers.
Conclusions
We have presented an approach for validation of policies with respect the devices to which they apply. Although we presented examples of DiffServ routers, the approach could be applied to validation of security management policies or building management policies etc. A representation of the device capabilities and states such as those in our CIM extensions is essential. Our approach applies to individual network devices within a domain in which the DiffServ based policies apply. The situation becomes much more complex when interactions between the policies related to end-to-end flows or different service level agseements.(SLAs) are considered. This requires determining whether the introduction of a new SLA could potentially violate the policies relating to existing SLAs. In the simplest situation this could require determining whether the current network topology has the resources to support the new SLA which can be done by Trafiic Engineering systems. However, when the SLAs cater for dynamic allocation of resources based on time or application requests, this becomes more complex to do. Another issue is that the end-to-end path may not be within the administrative domain of a single service provider. This requires interaction between service providers to exchange policy information, and current state of the network topology. These issues will be addressed in a new project in collaboration with Surrey University.
